

FOR PUBLICATION

USA 17-73153

**UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT**

LUDWIN ISRAEL LOPEZ-AGUILAR,
Petitioner,

v.

WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General
of the United States,
Respondent.

No. 17-73153

Agency No.
A074-394-680

OPINION

On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted March 5, 2019
Portland, Oregon

Filed January 28, 2020

Before: Susan P. Graber and Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit
Judges, and John R. Tunheim,* Chief District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Berzon;
Concurrence by Judge Graber

* The Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chief United States District
Judge for the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

the property owner, to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct which might aid the commission of the theft. For example, a defendant could be convicted if she threatened force against a third party to compel that third party to convince a property owner, by deception, to give the property to the defendant consensually. Similarly, a defendant could be convicted if the taking was consensual (although deceptive), but force was used against a third party to prevent that person from retrieving the property right after it was received by the thief. Consequently, the panel concluded that, even with the additional robbery elements, the text of the statute expressly includes situations involving consensual taking, and therefore is facially overbroad.

Because the government did not argue that section 164.935 was divisible, the panel deemed the issue waived, and ended its inquiry without proceeding to the modified approach.

Concurring, Judge Graber, joined by District Judge Tunheim, agreed with the opinion in full, but wrote separately to add her voice to the substantial chorus of federal judges pleading for the Supreme Court or Congress to “rescue us from the morass of the categorical approach,” which requires the performance of absurd legal gymnastics, and produces absurd results.

COUNSEL

Jennifer K. Lesmez (argued), Law Offices of Jennifer Lesmez, Selah, Washington; Jerome Mayer-Cantú, Oakland, California; for Petitioner.

I

Lopez-Aguilar is a native and citizen of Guatemala. He entered the United States in 1989, when he was three years old, and became a legal permanent resident in March 2001, when his application for suspension of deportation was granted.

In 2014, Lopez-Aguilar was convicted of third-degree robbery in violation of Oregon Revised Statutes section 164.395 and sentenced to 13 months in prison. The government initiated removal proceedings against Lopez-Aguilar based on the robbery conviction.

11
not
in
aggravated
felony

An immigration judge ("IJ") found Lopez-Aguilar removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in section 101(a)(43)(G) of the INA, which defines theft offenses for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year. The BIA agreed that the conviction was for a theft offense under section 101(a)(43)(G).¹

The BIA rejected Lopez-Aguilar's argument that section 164.395 is overbroad because it incorporates theft by deception and thus covers consensual takings. The BIA concluded that the statute requires taking property by force, which negates the consensual nature of theft by deception. The BIA also rejected Lopez-Aguilar's argument that section 164.395 is overbroad because it covers mere unauthorized use of a vehicle, affirmed the denial of Lopez-Aguilar's petition for relief under CAT, and affirmed the order that Lopez-Aguilar be removed to Guatemala.

¹ The BIA disagreed with the IJ's alternative conclusion that Lopez-Aguilar's conviction under section 164.395 was for a crime of violence under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the INA.

A

“A state offense qualifies as a generic offense—and therefore, in this case, as an aggravated felony—only if the full range of conduct covered by [the state statute] falls within the meaning of the generic offense.” *United States v. Alvarado-Pineda*, 774 F.3d 1198, 1202 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). *Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez* held that a state conviction is not a categorical match for its generic counterpart if there is “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime.” 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007).

There are two ways to show “a realistic probability” that a state statute exceeds the generic definition. First, there is not a categorical match if a state statute expressly defines a crime more broadly than the generic offense. *United States v. Grisel*, 488 F.3d 844, 850 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), *abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stitt*, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018). As long as the application of the statute’s express text in the nongeneric manner is not a logical impossibility, the relative likelihood of application to nongeneric conduct is immaterial. *See United States v. Valdivia-Flores*, 876 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). Second, a petitioner can show that a state statute exceeds the generic definition if the petitioner can “point to at least one case in which the state courts applied the statute” in a situation that does not fit under the generic definition. *United States v. Ruiz-Apolonio*, 657 F.3d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing *Duenas-Alvarez*, 549 U.S. at 193).

Here, the Oregon robbery statute is facially overbroad because its “greater breadth is evident from its text.” *Grisel*, 488 F.3d at 850.

Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.395. Section 164.395 incorporates Oregon’s definition of theft, which includes “theft by deception.” Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.015(4), 164.085.

The first requirement of section 164.395 is a theft or attempted theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle. A theft by deception satisfies this element. *See* Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.015(4), 164.085. The generic definition of theft requires that the taking be without consent. *Alvarado-Pineda*, 774 F.3d at 1202. We have explained elsewhere that theft statutes which include theft by deception fall outside the generic definition for theft. *See, e.g., Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch*, 798 F.3d 863, 868 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining that California’s theft statute is overbroad because it includes conduct such as theft by false pretenses, which could be consensual); *United States v. Rivera*, 658 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2011) (same), *abrogated on other grounds by Lopez-Valencia v. Lynch*, 798 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2015). Because it is possible to commit theft by deception with the consent of the owner, Oregon’s theft statute expressly includes conduct outside of the generic definition.

The additional robbery elements of section 164.395—namely, the use or threat of force to obtain the property—do not limit the reach of the statute to match the generic definition of theft. A force element generally implies a lack of consent—the force can be used, for example, to overcome resistance or otherwise compel behaviors. But the statute here expressly contemplates that such force may be used to “compel[]” “another person,” rather than the property owner, “to deliver the property or to engage in other conduct which might aid the commission of the theft.” Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.395(1)(b).

Consequently, even with the additional robbery elements, the text of the statute expressly includes situations

felonious taking of personal property in the possession of another . . . against *his* will.” 26 I. & N. Dec. at 810 n.2 (emphasis added) (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 211); *see also id.* at 812 (“[T]he jury instructions for section 211 of the California Penal Code require as an element that the defendant take property from another ‘against that person’s will.’” (citation omitted)).

In short, unlike the generic theft offense, section 164.395 does not require that the defendant engage in a nonconsensual taking. As the Oregon statute expressly includes consensual takings, it is facially overbroad. *See Grisel*, 488 F.3d at 850.

B

Because we hold that the statute is overbroad, we move to the next step in the analysis: determining whether the statute is divisible, such that application of the modified categorical approach is appropriate. *See Lopez-Valencia*, 798 F.3d at 867–68.

Oregon’s third-degree robbery statute is indivisible. In this case, the government did not argue otherwise. “On the merits of the divisibility inquiry, the government did not argue to us that section 164.395 is divisible. We therefore deem the issue waived.” *Barbosa v. Barr*, 926 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir. 2019). Because the statute of conviction is both overbroad and indivisible, the modified approach “has no role to play in this case” and the inquiry ends. *Descamps*, 570 U.S. at 264.

III

Accordingly, we hold that section 164.395 is facially overbroad and indivisible. As it therefore does not qualify as

under section 164.395, the fundamental problem is that, to escape the consequences of his actions under our immigration laws, Petitioner need not show that *he* carried out a consensual taking. Without a doubt, there are better ways to decide these cases. *See, e.g., Brown*, 879 F.3d at 1051 (advocating for “[a] regime based on the length of previous sentences, rather than on the vagaries of state law”).

The categorical approach allows individuals who have been convicted of serious crimes to avoid removal, so long as they are “clever enough to find some space in the state statutory scheme that lies outside the federal analogue.” *Valdivia-Flores*, 876 F.3d at 1211. As my colleagues have noted, we have no discretion in removal cases such as this one to correct absurd results—indeed, we must turn a blind eye even when the defendant’s actions underlying his state conviction unquestionably meet the definition of the generic federal offense. *Id.*

It is past time for someone with the power to fix this mess to do so.